Industrial Research at the Eastern Telegraph Company, 1872-1929 by Noakes, Richard
 1 






ABSTRACT:  By the late nineteenth century the submarine telegraph cable industry, 
which had blossomed in the 1850s, had reached what historians regard as technological 
maturity.  For a host of commercial, cultural and technical reasons, the industry seems to 
have become conservative in its attitude towards technological development, which is 
reflected in the small scale of its staff and facilities for research and development.  This 
paper argues that the attitude of the cable industry towards research and development was 
less conservative and altogether more complex than historians have suggested.  Focusing 
on the crucial case of the Eastern Telegraph Company, the largest single operator of 
submarine cables, it shows how the company encouraged inventive activity among 
outside and in-house electricians and, in 1903, established a small research laboratory 
where staff and outside scientific advisors pursued new methods of cable signalling and 
cable designs.  The scale of research and development at the Eastern Telegraph 
Company, however, was small by comparison to that of its nearest competitor, Western 
Union, and dwarfed by that of large electrical manufacturers.  This paper explores the 
reasons for this comparatively weak provision but also suggests that this was not 







 Historians of science and technology agree that nineteenth century submarine 
telegraphic enterprises constitute powerful examples of alliances of electrical science and 
engineering, commercial risk-taking and entrepreneurial zeal.1   In the wake of the 
expensive failures of the transatlantic telegraph cables of 1857-8, a network of natural 
philosophers, electricians, entrepreneurs and others constructed a host of new cable 
designs, telegraphic instruments, electrical standards and other technical developments 
that underpinned the string of successful submarine cables laid from the mid-1860s.   By 
the 1890s, the cable industry had reached technical maturity and, according to Bernard 
Finn, developed a ‘culture of lassitude’ insofar as it was content to use tried and tested 
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technologies rather than ‘promote meaningful change’.2  The conservatism is suggested 
by the stability of cable designs, failure of cable companies to exploit wireless and to 
pursue research and development on a scale comparable to that in large electrical 
manufacturers such as Bell and General Electric.3 
 Several reasons for this trend have been suggested.  First, from the 1870s until the 
1920s, the industry was dominated by a handful of mainly British-based firms, including 
the operators, the Eastern Telegraph Company (ETC), and the manufacturers, the 
Telegraph Construction and Maintenance Company (TCMC).  The near monopoly 
enjoyed by such firms made competing via new products and services unrealistic and 
significantly reduced the incentive to innovate.4  Second, until the early 1920s, cable 
manufacturers were reluctant to explore radical new cable designs because existing types 
enjoyed typical life spans of several decades, and were costly to replace and adequately 
served the needs of cable operators.  New cable designs represented a considerable 
commercial risk and threatened to render existing designs obsolete.5  Third, commercial 
and government-run cable organisations were bound together by a web of financial 
agreements, international regulations, and other links that made it difficult for any one 
organisation to make radical changes without disrupting these links.6  The ‘lassitude’ of 
cable firms seems especially striking in comparison to newer branches of the emerging 
electrical communications industry.  By the early twentieth century, wireless and 
telephony firms such as Bell and Western Electric were renowned for the scale and 
intensity of their industrial research and unsurprisingly would inspire some of the key 
contributions to the historiography of industrial research.7 
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 This paper suggests that attitudes to research and development (R&D) in the 
nineteenth and early twentieth century cable industry were more complex and less 
conservative than these interpretations claim.  It focuses on the critical case of the ETC 
from its foundation, in 1872, to 1929 when it was merged with its great rival, the Marconi 
Wireless Telegraph Company, and a host of smaller commercial and state-controlled 
cable and wireless operators.  Evaluating the ETC’s R&D activities is problematic 
because, like so many British firms in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, it 
was secretive about the matter.8  However, analysis of its unpublished business records 
and other materials yields important new insights.  As the following two sections show, 
its attitude towards research and development was far from conservative: from the 1870s 
onwards, it saw itself as an enterprise that actively encouraged and rewarded technical 
innovation, whether by giving external inventors the facilities for testing their apparatus 
and generous royalties, or by giving electrical staff financial assistance with patents and 
promotions for technical accomplishments.  Contrary to Finn’s claim that cable 
companies ‘failed to develop experimental laboratories, even after the turn of the 
century’, the ETC established a small research laboratory in 1903 where a handful of the 
company’s leading electricians pursued research and technical development, often in 
collaboration with external academic physicists and electrical engineers.9 
 The ETC’s research capacity ultimately proved very effective in standardising 
signalling practices adopted throughout the network and developing instruments that 
would increase the speed and capacity of transmission, and reduce the costs of manual 
working and of licensing external patents.  Most of these technical developments built 
incrementally on previous designs but they were far from being meaningless.  Section 
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four shows that despite an initial surge in growth, the scale of R&D at the ETC remained 
very modest and by the 1920s looked small compared to its nearest competitor, the 
American-based Western Union, which was itself dwarfed by the scale of R&D at the 
largest American and German electrical manufacturers.  While the ETC’s senior figures 
met some of the demands of electrical staff for better research facilities, they seemed to 
believe that a modest internal research culture focused mainly on instrumental 
development was sufficient to meet ongoing demands for a fast, accurate and cost-
effective service. 
 This paper addresses two related issues in the historiography of industrial R&D.  
The first concerns the definitions of industrial research.  Fox and Guagnini and others 
have established that in the decades around 1900 this activity could legitimately be called 
scientific, insofar as it involved experimentation, mathematical analysis, and the 
construction of general principles and laws, but a great deal of it focused on ‘routine’ and 
typically unspectacular industry-based tasks such as instrumental testing, incremental 
technical development, patent protection, standardisation, and quality control.10  These 
tasks were arguably more representative of industrial research than the development of 
radical new products and processes.  Historians have also established that personnel and 
sites of industrial research were more diverse than earlier studies of industrial R&D 
suggested: it was pursued by personnel whose technical expertise derived mainly from 
long experience of industrial processes as well as academically-trained scientists, and 
took place in workshops, factories and other ‘non-scientific’ sites as well as centralised 
laboratories.11  Sensitivity to the heterogeneity of industrial research makes the situation 
at the ETC rosier than historians have assumed and highly instructive.  Research in this 
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firm was mainly conducted by electrical staff who had trained within the firm, but some 
tasks were delegated to outside scientific advisors with academic qualifications.  Much of 
this activity was concentrated in the central research laboratory, but this should not 
detract from the important investigations that took place in remote cable ships and cable 
stations. 
 The second issue is the scale of British industrial R&D.  Studies by Edgerton and 
Horrocks and others have demonstrated that before1945, and even before 1914, this 
quantity was larger than historians have claimed.12  This weakened an older view that 
Britain’s economic decline relative to Germany and the United States after 1870 owed 
much to the failure of British business to invest in R&D and to adopt the organisational 
structures of the research-intensive American firms that were the subject of much-debated 
analyses by Alfred Chandler Jr. and his school.13  British industrial R&D was certainly 
larger than this literature suggested, but it was still smaller than that in the United States 
by1914.14  The following analysis does not alter current understanding of the overall 
scale of British industrial R&D before 1945 but it does contribute to a growing literature 
highlighting the different scales and forms that it could take and which argues that the 
model of R&D established in large American and German manufacturing firms on which 
Chandlerian analysis was based, was not necessarily appropriate to all firms, in all sectors 
and in all countries.15  As a firm that did no manufacturing, and whose chief goals 
included providing a fast, reliable and profit-making communication service and both 
maintaining and expanding an expensive global network of cables, we need to be alive to 
the possibility that its idea of an effective scale, focus and organisation of research may 
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have been very different from that at manufacturing firms Western Electric with which it 
was sometimes contrasted.16 
 
 
2.  THE EASTERN TELEGRAPH COMPANY AND SOURCES OF INNOVATION 
 
 The Eastern Telegraph Company’s dominance of the nineteenth and early 
twentieth century submarine telegraph cable business is well known.17  This British-based 
company was established in 1872 from the amalgamation of four smaller cable firms 
founded to operate a chain of strategically and commercially important submarine cables 
connecting Britain to India via the Mediterranean.  As the provider of one of the fastest 
communication channels to the east, the ETC secured business from its wealthy clientele 
in the worlds of commerce, finance and politics and used much of its healthy profit for 
expansion.  By 1892 it had become financially linked to, and the dominant member of, a 
large consortium of cable operating companies called the Eastern and Associated 
Telegraph Companies (or ‘Eastern group’), which operated approximately 113,000km of 
cable connecting the group’s headquarters in central London to cable stations all over the 
globe including Africa, Australia, the Far East, and South America.  This represented 
nearly 46% of the total length of the world’s cables and by the turn of the twentieth 
century made the ETC one of the ten richest non-manufacturing companies in Britain.18  
Even by 1923, when the Eastern group was starting to face serious competition from rival 
cable operators and radio, it operated over 235,000km of cable which represented a 
smaller but still sizeable global share of nearly 40%. 
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Like all nineteenth century commercial operators of inland and submarine 
telegraph cables, the ETC saw its main purpose as providing a rapid and reliable service 
to customers, healthy dividends to shareholders, and generating capital for expansion.19 
To maintain and improve the speed and accuracy of telegrams, the ETC relied heavily on 
the technical expertise of its own ‘electrical’ and ‘mechanical’ staff and of electrical 
engineers and physicists outside the firm.  Almost all company electricians were to 
employed to test and maintain the cables, telegraphic signalling and receiving 
instruments, batteries and other equipment whose faults cost the firm valuable line time.  
Until the early 1900s, outside inventors were generally seen as the principal source of 
major technical innovations, especially if these promised to increase the accuracy and 
speed of transmission, which were typically seen as ways of raising capacity and 
revenue.20  This latter strategy was embodied in the twenty-one patent licensing 
agreements that the ETC signed between 1872 and 1929, some of which referred to such 
widely-used instruments as William Thomson’s siphon recorder of 1870 (which produced 
a permanent record of the faint signals emerging from long submarine cables), Alexander 
Muirhead’s duplex apparatus of 1876 (enabling simultaneous transmission and 
reception), and Sidney Brown’s ‘drum’ relay of 1899 (which considerably improved the 
speed and accuracy with which received signals were automatically passed onto 
recording instruments or to another cable).21 
The annual royalties for these inventions, and therefore the cost of spreading the 
risk of technological development to outside experts, often reached several thousand 
pounds, and it was an expense that the ETC would eventually try to reduce by appealing 
to the expertise of its own staff. 22  This latter strategy was certainly considered more 
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appropriate to the question of telegraphic instruments than to the design of the cable itself 
because the ETC and its founder-chairman John Pender had close connections with the 
TCMC, who were its chief contractors for making and laying cables and whose engineers 
were treated as the principal sources of change in cable design.  For example, an 1886 
cable contract that the ETC signed with TCMC specified the use of a low inductive form 
of gutta percha insulation developed by the leading TCMC electrician Willoughby 
Smith.23  Forty years later, the ETC’s largest associate, the Eastern Extension Telegraph 
Company, exploited the TCMC’s ‘inductively loaded’ form of cable, in which the central 
copper conductor was surrounded by an iron-nickel alloy tape.24  First successfully used 
in short telephone lines, inductive loading enabled faster signalling by reducing two of 
the most notorious problems in telegraphic and telephonic transmission: the reduction in 
the definition and strength of signals caused by the enormous electrostatic capacity of the 
cables. 
 The ETC saw itself as an organisation that rewarded inventors with generous 
royalties and actively encouraged technical innovation.  When, in 1878, the German-
English electrical engineer William Siemens publicly attacked Pender’s monopolistic 
cable business for quashing the ‘ingenuity and enterprise of the telegraph engineer’, 
Pender insisted that the firm ‘encourages all inventors’ and gave ‘fullest consideration’ to 
‘scientific men’ who ‘bring us any improvement which will supersede the existing 
instruments’ or ‘produce a cable of quality and strength’.25  Its patent licensing 
agreements reflected an ‘open competition’ policy because they gave the firm the right to 
suspend payments to existing patentees if their inventions were superseded and to 
continue if the original patentees produced an even better alternative.26  Siemens’s 
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response is unknown but not all of those outside electrical engineers and physicists who 
engaged with the company shared his anxieties.  Indeed, they often publicly thanked the 
ETC for providing the crucial resources – notably a large cable network and electrical 
staff – for investigative and development work.  In 1910, for example, trial runs of the 
‘drum’ relay at the ETC’s principal British station at Porthcurno, far west Cornwall, 
provided an appreciate Sidney Brown with the opportunity to identify and correct an 
otherwise fatal wandering of the zero line of positive and negative signals received by the 
relay.  A decade late electrical engineer Douglas Gall was grateful to the ETC for the 
facilities needed to make a systematic study of the impedance of submarine cables.27 
 The ETC’s patent licensing agreements might suggest that, like the Western 
Union Telegraph Company at the end of the nineteenth century, it adopted what Israel 
calls a ‘passive approach’ to innovation insofar as it merely waited for external inventors 
to make ‘technical improvements’ rather than actively direct such processes.28  But Israel 
points out that from the late 1860s Western Union’s electrical staff not only took an 
active role in investigating and assessing these ‘improvements’ prior to adoption but 
‘increasingly made important inventions of their own’.29   For reasons of commercial 
secrecy or even lack of interest on the part of journal editors, a great deal of the inventive 
and research activity of ETC staff was never published.30   For all their limitations as 
historical sources, published patents do suggest that Israel’s description characterises the 
electrical staff in the ETC. 
 By 1900 the ETC’s electrical staff numbered over one hundred, most of whom 
had acquired their technical expertise via the firm’s internal programme of training 
telegraphic operators and electricians and subsequent postings to overseas cable stations 
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and ships.31   Between 1872 and 1929 many of them had secured full protection on 
approximately ninety patent specifications.32  Most of these patented inventions were 
electrical, mechanical or electromechanical devices relating to the way signals were 
transmitted, received, shaped, amplified and recorded, although a handful of devices 
produced in the 1920s exploited the relatively new technology of thermionic valves.  
Similar to the patents licensed from external inventors, these generally addressed the 
question of increasing the accuracy and speed of transmission, and of reducing the 
reliance on typically costly and often inaccurate manual working. 
 A significant but unsurprising number of internal patents focused on two of the 
most pressing issues in late nineteenth century cable telegraphy: relaying and duplex 
balancing.  The engineer and writer on telegraphy Charles Bright spoke for many in the 
cable industry when, in 1898, he observed that ‘With a view to effecting automatic, 
instead of manual, translation between lengths of submarine line, the cable relay may be 
said to have been the dream of the cable manager for years, and one that has occupied the 
minds of many an electrician’.33  Typically, relays were electromechanical devices that, 
in response to an electrical signal, switched a local circuit having the power to actuate a 
device for passing on or registering the signal.  They occupied the minds of so many 
cable managers because the electrical impulses arriving in distant cable stations were 
often too faint to cause a sufficient or reliable electrical contact in relays.34 
 Duplex balancing proved no less of a headache to cable managers.  One of the 
most widely-used forms of duplex telegraphy used in the cable service exploited a 
Wheatstone bridge circuit in which two arms were the cable and an ‘artificial line’, which 
comprised an array of resistances and condensers chosen to mimic the electrical 
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properties of the real cable as accurately as possible.  If the arms of the bridge were 
properly balanced, signals could be simultaneously sent and received.  However, the 
balance was easily disturbed (for example, by the effects of temperature on the cable or 
the use of sensitive instruments) and manual rebalancing was frequently necessary.35  As 
late as 1922 Walter Judd, who served as electrician-in-chief to the ETC and Eastern 
group between 1905 and 1919, could lament that duplex balancing remained a task 
involving electricians’ ‘personal skill, intuition and experience’ and had spent much of 
his career encouraging his staff to pursue technical alternatives to this ‘trial and error’ 
approach.36 
 Many of the ETC’s patents represented merely incremental improvements to such 
widely-used instruments as Thomson’s siphon recorder but others constituted more 
significant steps.  Outstanding examples of these latter achievements are the devices 
patented in the 1920s relating to signal regeneration.  These represented one of the most 
important outcomes of the ETC’s internal research capacity and, by enabling signals to be 
passed from one cable to another without manual reshaping, its quest to increase 
transmission speed and accuracy and reduce staff costs .  The basic mechanism for 
automatically reforming or regenerating signals that had become attenuated and distorted 
by passage through long submarine cables had its origins in the multiplex system of 
telegraphy developed by the French telegraph engineer Emile Baudot in the last decades 
of the nineteenth century.  A key feature of the Baudot system was that a receiving 
instrument broke up an incoming distorted signal, selected its central and least distorted 
portion and passed on a relatively undistorted signal to another cable or recording 
apparatus.  The effectiveness of the system depended critically on synchronisation of the 
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speed and phase of rotating electromechanical distributors in the transmitting and 
receiving instruments and this was originally achieved using a correcting signal sent from 
the transmitting instrument.37  In the early 1900s, the Baudot system was exploited and 
developed by operators such as the British Post Office, the Western Union and the ETC, 
but for many electricians the original synchronisation method could not satisfactorily 
handle the highly distorted signals of long submarine cables and its correcting signal used 
valuable line time.  In the mid-1920s the inventions that Harry Higgitt, William Jacob 
and other ETC electricians devised to solve these problems were hailed for their accuracy 
and stability: these included devices that used electric clocks, vibrating reed switches and 
phonic wheels to precisely control the speed of the distributors in the transmitting and 
receiving instruments, and used normal rather than additional signals to ensure synchrony 
between the distributors.38  None of these devices changed cable telegraphy as 
significantly as the siphon recorder or duplex, but as we shall see, their impact on the 
ETC’s business was profound. 
 The ETC’s policy on the patents, insofar as it was stated, would have given staff 
an incentive to improve existing or develop new inventions.    As a co-applicant on most 
patents associated with staff, the firm evidently gave financial and legal help towards 
securing patents in exchange for part ownership of the invention protected.   This had 
become a formal policy by 1909 when the ETC’s Board of Directors agreed to 
‘provisionally protect each idea or method that appears to be promising enough to 
warrant the expense’ and to consider full protection in the light of further ‘experience’ of 
the invention.39  Fifteen years later, a related, but more direct incentive to in-house 
inventing activity appeared in the form of a ‘Suggestions and Inventions Committee’, 
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which was partly established to find technical ways of reducing operating costs at a time 
when the firm’s revenue had been severely reduced by the post-war global economic 
slump.40  For inventions deemed ‘novel and worth patenting’, the Committee gave 
financial and legal assistance towards securing full patent protection as well as cash 
prizes.  Many of the inventions submitted between 1924 and 1927, which included 
improvements to automatic transmitters and relays, were patented, constructed and rolled 
out for service.41 
 The ETC’s culture of rewarding in-house technical innovation existed long before 
the 1920s and often referred to work arising from routine instrumental testing and 
maintenance work.    For example, in 1900, Charles Schaefer, an ETC electrician serving 
aboard the cable ship Amber, enjoyed a similar career boost in recognition of his 
published papers describing new methods of determining the position of cable faults, and 
which embodied empirical laws relating the resistance of an area of cable conductor 
exposed to sea water and the strength of the passing current.42  Schaefer was certainly not 
the last electrician to be promoted or recognised by the ETC for contributions to methods 
of electrical measurement, fault detection and other issues which the firm judged to be 
useful to its service and allowed to be published because it evidently saw any technique 
that would expedite repairs as beneficial to the cable business as a whole.43   Neither is he 
the only electrician whose career challenges narrow conceptions of the locations and 
subject matters of industrial research and development in the early 1900s.  As we shall 
see in section five, many of the ETC’s ‘research’ staff divided their time between the 
central research laboratory and remote cable stations where their duties included the 
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standardisation of cable signalling techniques, the investigation of new instruments from 




3.  THE LABORATORY AND OLIVER LODGE 
 
 In 1907 William Henry Preece, the retired engineer-in-chief to the British Post 
Office, observed in a paper read to the British Association for the Advancement of 
Science that: 
 
It speaks well for the technical spirit of the age that splendidly equipped experimental 
laboratories have been established in London at the General Post Office, National 
Telephone Company’s central station, the Eastern Telegraph Company’s headquarters, 
Electra House, and in New York and Boston, in America, by the American Bell 
Telephone Companies.  Very satisfactory advances have been made in Great Britain, and 
excellent reports of progress have been published by the Institution of Electrical 
Engineers in London.44  
 
While historical analysis of industrial research has paid close attention to the laboratories 
at the Post Office, National Telephone Company and Bell, nothing comparable exists for 
the Eastern Telegraph Company’s equivalent space.45  In the early 1900s, however, 
Preece was not alone in thinking that this laboratory exuded a progressive ‘technical 
spirit’.   One was the eminent British physicist and Principal of Birmingham University, 
Oliver Lodge, who attended Preece’s address.  Lodge was generally impressed by the 
space and from 1903 agreed to act as an outside advisor to the Eastern group and oversee 
much of the research conducted in the new laboratory on new methods of cable signalling 
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and cable design.46   The establishment of the Electra House laboratory and the 
recruitment of Lodge represented a significant change in the ETC’s attitude towards 
centralised research and the role of outside electrical experts. 
 When the Electra House laboratory was founded in 1902 these kinds of 
workspaces were increasingly common features of commercial and government 
organisations in industrialised countries, and reflected a wider shift towards more 
organised research and development activities.47  By this time centralised laboratories 
were well established in the electrical industry, including several involved in the 
manufacture of telegraphic instruments and cables, such as Siemens and Halske, TCMC, 
and Western Electric, while the ETC’s great American rival, Western Union, had only 
recently turned the ‘repair shop’ in its New York headquarters into a large laboratory.48  
The Electra House laboratory was principally the outcome of the request of the 
electrician-in-chief Henry Saunders who in May 1902 persuaded the ETC’s Board of 
Directors to pay for a room ‘fitted up with necessary apparatus and appliances for 
electrical experiments and the testing of new methods and inventions’.49  The laboratory, 
installed in Electra House’s cupola, also functioned as a workshop and first occupants 
included Saunders and two of the most skilled electricians in the service – Charles 
Schaefer and Julian Elton Young – who formed the core of a new ‘Investigation Branch’ 
of the ETC’s Electrical Department.50  As a space initially established for testing rather 
than the development of new products, the Electra House laboratory was far from 
untypical of many industrial laboratories in this period.  As several historians have 
pointed out, even General Electric’s celebrated research laboratory began life as space 
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focusing on putatively ‘routine’ tasks such as standardisation, testing and increasing the 
reliability of existing products.51 [FIGURE 2 HERE] 
 There are several reasons the ETC’s Board of Directors would have looked on 
Saunders’ request so favourably.  First, they clearly understood that more space and 
resources, as well as a dedicated electrical staff was needed to test new apparatus for 
coping with what the ETC’s chairman John Wolfe-Barry saw as firm’s ‘ever-growing 
volume of work’.52  These tests almost certainly included those involved in an expensive 
patent licensing agreement of 1901 which referred to Sidney Brown’s drum relay and 
other instruments that the ETC envisioned as important solutions to its traffic problems.53   
A second, but less significant reason, was wireless telegraphy.  Shareholders in the ETC 
and most cable companies were unsurprisingly nervous when, in December 1901, 
Guglielmo Marconi and his collaborators transmitted wireless telegraphic signals across 
the Atlantic ocean and created a form of rapid, long-distance communication that 
seriously threatened the hegemony of cables.  Wolfe-Barry, however, reassured wealthy 
subscribers that wireless did not threaten their investments because, for the foreseeable 
future, cable telegraphy was likely to outperform it in terms of the speed and accuracy of 
transmission, secrecy, and freedom from atmospheric electricity.54  Despite this 
complacent public face, the ETC took wireless seriously enough to initiate experimental 
tests of different wireless systems and to exploit it for improving communication between 
cable ships and the shore and to feed additional traffic into cables.55  A third, but far more 
significant reason, was an altogether closer and more tangible threat.  This was the 
completion, in 1902, of the trans-Pacific cable which was financed and run by the 
Australian, British, Canadian and New Zealand governments.  Designed to strengthen 
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Britain’s telegraphic ties with its colonies and offer cheaper and faster alternative to the 
ETC’s notoriously expensive telegrams, the Pacific cable, had such an adverse effect on 
the ETC’s Anglo-Australasian traffic that the firm lowered its rates and by 1904 an 
anxious Wolfe Barry was reassuring worried ETC shareholders that the firm was 
‘continuing its old policy of constantly endeavouring to improve the speed and accuracy 
of their service by the application of the latest forms of apparatus’.56  For this strategy to 
be effective, the ETC needed a dedicated space and resources. 
 Wolfe-Barry’s attitude towards research and technology development was, I 
suggest, much more positive than we might suppose from his rather cavalier dismissal of 
the threat of that technological newcomer, wireless.  A distinguished civil engineer who 
served as chairman until 1917, Wolfe-Barry brought a technical understanding to this 
powerful position that his two predecessors, John Pender and William Montagu Hay (the 
10th Marquess of Tweedale) lacked.57  While in 1878 Pender doubted that ‘scientific 
men’ had the capacity to work outside their laboratories and engage with commercial 
issues, in early 1903 Wolfe-Barry insisted that one of the ways that Britain could regain 
the industrial lead it had lost to the United States and Germany was to have ‘the man of 
science installed in his laboratory in most important manufactories’.58   By the time 
Wolfe-Barry uttered these words he was already discussing the possibility of having a 
‘man of science’ closely involved in the work of his own laboratory at Electra House.  
Indeed, by July 1903, he delighted ETC shareholders by announcing that Oliver Lodge, 
who he already knew through a mutual association with the National Physical 
Laboratory, had agreed to act as a consulting scientific adviser to the Eastern group as a 
whole.  This was an implicit recognition that the ETC electrical staff could no longer 
 18
keep the firm at the ‘forefront of scientific developments in cable and cable instruments’ 
without the help of an academically-trained physicist or electrical engineer.59 
 Lodge’s role as scientific consultant to the Eastern group might seem strange 
given that in the 1880s and 1890s he had exasperated many ‘practical’ electricians 
employed by cable firms by defending the argument of his friend and fellow Maxwellian 
physicist Oliver Heaviside that self-inductance was beneficial to telegraphic and 
telephonic transmission and that Maxwellian theory was at least as important as practical 
experience in solving electrical puzzles.60  However, Lodge was evidently prepared to 
work with electricians and other ‘practical’ men on commercial schemes where he stood 
to gain financially from sharing his electrical knowledge.  This is suggested by the fact 
that he was one of a growing number of academic physicists who acted as a scientific 
advisor to firms in the electrical industry, and in the 1890s he became involved with two 
Eastern group companies who exploited the syntonic form of wireless telegraphy that he 
and Alexander Muirhead promoted through a business syndicate.61  He was also prepared 
to present the ETC with a formal assessment of the wireless ‘threat’ and it was his 
reassuring verdict to which Wolfe Barry had appealed in his speech to nervous ETC 
shareholders in early 1902.62 
 Lodge was certainly more tolerant of electricians and cable companies than was 
Heaviside who, in late 1902, declined Wolfe Barry’s invitation to help the ETC improve 
the speed and efficiency of its network by application of his theory of ‘distortionless’ 
cables.63  Published in the late 1880s, Heaviside’s theory predicted that telegraphic 
signals would be transmitted without distortion and with reduced attenuation, if the ratio 
of cable inductance (L) to resistance (R) matched that of electrostatic capacity (S) to 
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leakage conductance (K).  In long submarine cables, however, S/K was much larger than 
L/R owing to high S (caused by cable sheathing and sea water) and very low K (because 
of the high quality of insulation around the conductor).  Making L/R = S/R meant either 
decreasing R (which usually meant using higher quality and more expensive copper for 
the conductor) and/or ‘loading’ it with additional L.  Wolfe Barry would have known that 
by the early 1900s different schemes for inductively ‘loading’ overland and short 
submarine telephone lines had been successfully implemented although its applicability 
to long submarine cables was uncertain.64 
 Undoubtedly excited by the prospects of being paid to tackle this puzzle, Lodge 
wasted little time putting himself forward as a substitute for Heaviside.  He had already 
begun cable telegraphy experiments in Birmingham but the ETC role would give him the 
money, equipment and staff time needed to properly develop the work while fulfilling 
‘pressing’ teaching and administrative responsibilities.65  As far as Lodge was concerned 
the goal of increasing the speed and efficiency of signalling required systematic research 
into the methods of sending and receiving signals and into cable design.  He was 
relatively confident about the first strand since he was already developing a sensitive 
microphonic device for amplifying received signals and exploring self-inductance at the 
sending end as a way of creating short, high voltage pulses that would not suffer 
significant distortion on passage through a long cable.  However, as he warned Wolfe 
Barry in July 1903, redesigning cables was going to be the ‘most expensive and difficult 
part of the business’ given the cost of the artificial line and other apparatus, and 
uncertainties regarding the achievement of distortionless condition in real cables.66 
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 By the time Lodge expressed these hopes and anxieties he had already signed an 
agreement to act as ‘scientific adviser and investigator’ to the ETC and its associates for 
five years.67  The position came with a substantial annual salary of £1,000 and additional 
annual amounts for laboratory and other expenses.  It entitled Lodge to use the Electra 
House laboratory’s equipment and staff, although it expected him to use his own 
laboratory and staff at Birmingham and allowed him to have assistants pursue research at 
the London and Kent workshops of Alexander Muirhead, the eminent electrical engineer 
recognized by and evidently ‘approved’ by the Eastern group.68  Lodge was also expected 
to communicate his advice in written form to either Wolfe-Barry or an appropriate ETC 
official chosen by the chairman.  However, this advice and the results of research done by 
Lodge’s assistants would also be summarised for the ETC’s Board of Directors by the 
electrician-in-chief who, as we shall see, often added his own commercial and technical 
assessment that weighed heavily with the board and shaped the course of Lodge’s 
investigations. 
 The flexibility on research sites proved crucial since Lodge had decided by mid-
1903 that it was easier for him to ‘conduct’ most of the research remotely, by 
communicating detailed instructions to his personal laboratory assistant Benjamin Davies 
who would be temporarily located in Electra House and the Muirhead sites.  Similar to 
the Electra House electricians with whom he would develop great camaraderie, Davies 
lacked a formal scientific education, but he acquired considerable expertise in physics 
and electrical engineering since entering Lodge’s service in 1882 and had proved himself 
a reliable extension of Lodge’s experimental body in the1890s when he worked at 
Muirhead’s workshops on the Lodge-Muirhead wireless system.69  Davies would prove 
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an ideal bridge between the worlds of academic physics and commercial telegraphy.   
Owing to his educational background, he could introduce new approaches to electrical 
problems to Electra House staff without the intellectual hubris that seems to have been 
the source of doubts about a ‘cordial cooperation’ between Lodge and the electricians.70 
 
 
4.  THE SCALE OF R&D AT THE EASTERN TELEGRAPH COMPANY 
 The Electra House laboratory and Lodge’s advisory position represent obvious 
starting points in evaluating the scale of R&D at the ETC from the early 1900s to 1929.  
The original Electra House laboratory cost the ETC an undisclosed amount, but its 
relocations and expansions within the same premises, in 1905 and 1920, cost £400 and 
£10,000 respectively.71   Between 1903 and 1908 Lodge cost the firm over £12,000 which 
included an additional £2,500 for apparatus used in loaded cable experiments and £100 a 
year to allow Davies to live in London.72  In addition to Lodge’s costs, between 1907 and 
1925 the Eastern group paid approximately £2,500 for five additional outside advisors – 
four electrical engineers and a chemist boasting academic qualifications – to carry out 
short-term investigations on wireless, loaded cables and other questions.73 
 Salaries help establish a fuller picture of the ETC’s provision for R&D.  The main 
problem here is establishing a comprehensive list of ETC staff who did research, and 
what proportion of their salary can be regarded as R&D, but service records identify staff 
members who, during part of their service career, worked in the Electra House laboratory 
and can therefore be assumed to have been paid to do research.74  As we have seen, staff 
members outside the central laboratory were also involved in research and so this is an 
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underestimate of the salary contribution.  Except for a drop during the First World War 
the number of core laboratory staff between 1902 and 1929 remained relatively level at 
approximately four, although they were occasionally joined by other ETC electricians 
and outside scientific advisors.75  At various times the staff included Higgitt, Schaefer, 
Young, Kenneth Wood, William Jacob and Davies, who in 1908 left Lodge to work for 
the ETC full time.76  In the years when they worked in the laboratory their annual salaries 
rose from around £300 to £1000 which constitute contributions to annual R&D spending 
of about £1,000 in the 1900s, £1,500 in the 1910s and £2,000 in the 1920s.  Combining 
all this quantitative information, the ETC’s average annual R&D spending was 
approximately £2,400 for the 1900s, £1,600 for the 1910s, and £3,000 for the 1920s.   
These represent much less than about one percent of the total annual expenses of the 
ETC.77 
 The significance of these estimates becomes clearer when comparing with the 
R&D in other firms.  Between 1900 and the 1929, the ETC’s annual R&D expenditure 
was between roughly ten and one hundred times smaller than that of the largest British 
manufacturing firms.78  Similar differences of scale emerge from comparisons between 
the ETC and leading American electrical manufacturers.79  Even a smaller British 
manufacturer such as the Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company had a post-war annual 
R&D budget of around £40,000, which constituted over fifteen percent of its total 
expenses.80  None of these comparisons, however, is fair given that the ETC was not a 
manufacturing firm.  A better comparison is with the Western Union which, like the ETC 
focused on services.  In 1901 the major American telegraph firm had a single laboratory 
measuring 500 square feet which six staff occupied, but by 1925, and mainly as a result 
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of a short-lived takeover by American Telephone and Telegraph, it had laboratories 
specialising in mechanical, chemical, cable and other areas which occupied a total of 
about 14,000 square feet and which employed over 25 staff.81  The Electra House 
laboratory compares well in the early years: between 1905 and 1920 it took up nearly 
2,000 square feet and was occupied by about four core staff.82  However, the subsequent 
expansion compares poorly since it involved only an additional room and no extra core 
staff.  In many ways, this is consistent with Edgerton’s finding that by the 1920s 
American firms outpaced British firms in terms of expenditure on, and size of personnel 
and premises connected with R&D.83  [FIGURE 3 HERE] 
 The comparison with Western Union is complicated by the fact that it was more 
diverse than the ETC.  It operated both inland and submarine cables and accordingly 
focused much of its research on questions that were more important to inland than 
submarine cable telegraphy, such as stock ticker services and telegraph poles.84  
Furthermore, it would not have made commercial sense for the ETC to follow the 
Western Union’s example of devoting significant amounts of R&D to chemical, 
metallurgical and mechanical questions relating to cable manufacturing and laying when 
these were undertaken by the cable manufacturers with which it had close links (TCMC 
and Henley’s) and which had large two-storey research laboratories by the 1920s.85   
Nevertheless, the foregoing quantitative analysis suggests that the ETC’s provision for 
R&D may have had an impressive start (as Preece’s remarks suggest) but by the interwar 
years it was being seriously outpaced by that of an increasingly aggressive competitor.   
The next section explores the achievements of this modest-sized centre of industrial 




5.  BETWEEN ‘RESEARCH’ AND ‘ROUTINE’ 
 In a draft obituary notice of his Electra House laboratory colleague Wilfrid Gaye, 
Benjamin Davies recalled in the late 1920s that the main duties of laboratory staff fell 
into three ‘distinct classes’: first, to ‘place all work as far as possible on a scientific 
basis’; second, to ‘systematise the cable system so that control from head office became 
definite’; and third, to ‘explore the ground for new methods of working’.86  In his first 
three years as Lodge’s representative, Davies focused mainly on the third class of work 
since this was the main requirement of the Birmingham professor’s advisory position, but 
thereafter joined his ETC-trained colleagues in fulfilling all three classes, the first two of 
which focused heavily on instrumental testing and development. 
 Davies’s first tasks involved exploring Lodge’s suggestions regarding 
distortionless cables and new methods of sending and receiving signals.   He and Young 
tackled the first issue mainly at the Electra House laboratory because this housed the 
enormous artificial line that was needed to simulate how the transmission qualities of real 
oceanic cables depended on the quantity and distribution of inductance and leakage 
conductance.  The second issue, which was undertaken principally at Muirhead’s London 
workshop, focused on Lodge’s suggestions regarding improvements to the siphon 
recorder and the use of inductance coils and condensers to improve the definition and 
speed of transmitted signals.87 
 Davies’s painstaking measurements of the speed and attenuation of signals sent 
through different arrangements of the artificial line suggested that certain combinations of 
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inductance and leakage conductance added to the line (in the form of induction coils and 
earthed resistors) significantly improved the speed and definition of transmission, but that 
this was going to be difficult to achieve on actual long cables owing principally to the 
difficulty of making them with iron or other inductive materials of sufficiently high 
magnetic permeability.88  But in his reports to the ETC’s Board of Directors in 1905, 
ETC chief electrician Walter Judd stressed that Davies’s experiments had shown that 
improving cable performance would not require radical design changes: a cable with the 
thickest copper conductor feasible was faster, easier to construct and altogether cheaper 
than one with a thinner conductor uniformly shrouded by the highest permeability iron 
used in commercial transformers.89   As far as Judd was concerned, this appeared to 
‘defer indefinitely’ the adoption of iron-coated cable conductors and evidently persuaded 
the ETC elite that Lodge and Davies could make better use of ETC money on other 
investigations.90  Lodge agreed with Judd’s argument, but he would have been frustrated 
that further investigations into distortionless cables using ETC resources and staff could 
not be commercially justified, even if they promised important scientific insights.91 
 Despite being mothballed in late 1905, the research into distortionless cables 
helped the ETC electricians tackle the pressing question of how inductance could benefit 
cable telegraphy more generally.  By the early 1900s, the ETC and other cable companies 
were exploiting Sidney Brown’s ‘magnetic’ version of a Wheatstone bridge circuit for 
duplex telegraphy and his magnetic shunt used across a siphon recorder.  Comprising 
arrangements of iron-cored inductance coils, these devices reduced the duration and 
strength of received signals but sharpened their definition, and made it possible for 
recorders and relays to handle higher rates of signalling.92  Combining aspects of the 
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distortionless cable work, reports of cable station staff using Brown’s inventions, and 
original research, Davies and Gaye established that a large amount of inductance at the 
receiving and sending ends of a cable could significantly improve transmission speed and 
embodied this in a ‘service pamphlet’ of 1909 which included empirical formulae for 
helping all Eastern group electricians calculate the optimum value and form of inductance 
to be used.93  Some of the procedures described in this publication were among the most 
widely-adopted outputs of the Lodge-ETC collaboration and powerfully illustrate the 
extent to which the ETC saw standardisation as a key constituent of research.94 
 By the time Davies and Gaye’s pamphlet was published, Davies had become a 
full-time member of the ETC and while the firm still paid Lodge a consultancy salary, 
they seem to have been less interested his advice than in exploiting Davies’s electrical 
knowledge and skills in pressing commercial and technical challenges.95  The most 
common were constructing new relays, amplifiers, and methods of duplex balancing, 
investigating the performance of in-house and external inventions, and troubleshooting 
technical problems reported by cable station superintendents.96  Much of relay and 
amplifier work took place at Electra House and Porthcurno from around 1911 to the 
outbreak of the First World War and resulted in several new inventions from Davies and 
others.  Most relays used for long submarine cables had used the positive and negative 
pulses of ‘cable code’ rather than the older dots and dashes of Morse code whose 
enormous loss of definition in transit rendered them useless for this kind of telegraphy.  
However, an invention that Davies and Judd patented in 1914 enabled signals to be sent 
in Morse code and received with a definition and accuracy better than that of cable 
code.97  Installing this and other inventions proved to be laborious, frustrating and for 
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Davies, not of ‘high scientific interest’, but by the early years of the First World War the 
work had enabled the ETC to turn Porthcurno into a relay station with a reduced staff 
and, following the expiry of a 1901 agreement to use Brown’s drum relay and other 
external patents, reduce its annual patent costs from around £1000 to £70.98 
 The First World War had a serious impact on research at the ETC.  Some 
experimental work was undertaken but since the core laboratory staff spent much of the 
war in military research (such as Davies) or on active military service (such as Kenneth 
Wood), it proved virtually impossible to pursue the kind of collaborative work that 
proved so effective before the war.99  Even after the conflict, the ETC faced a series of 
commercial and organisational problems that were seen to be far more significant than a 
perceived lack of research capacity.  Well into the early 1920s the priorities of the ETC 
remained focussed on dealing with a huge increase in traffic which, since its start in the 
First World War, had boosted profits and further raised the commercial importance of 
maintaining existing and laying additional cables.100  The task of maintaining a busier and 
larger network put a significant strain on the ETC’s electrical department and forced 
laboratory staff to take on more routine work.  For Davies and other laboratory staff, 
however, the ETC’s priorities looked increasingly questionable.   Working in a laboratory 
whose size and staff numbers were very small, and with ‘routine work’ relating to traffic 
absorbing time he required for research, he expressed more widely-shared misgivings 
about the organisation of British industrial research and envied commercial and 
government organisations with the far larger facilities for R&D.101  From late 1919 he 
complained bitterly to Lodge that he and other ETC electricians resented the ‘purely 
business side’ of the ETC who were ‘absolutely blind to science’, who only grudgingly 
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supported a new laboratory dedicated to ‘research’ rather than ‘routine’ matters, and who 
did not appreciate the potential benefits of research into relatively unexplored areas such 
as inductively loaded cables.102 
 Davies’s bitterness was particularly acute in 1922 when he reached his ETC 
retirement age having only ‘half finished’ researches on loaded cables that, owing partly 
to the capacity of new thermionic valves to detect the kind of faint signals received from 
such cables, had been revived by Judd in 1918.103  Davies’s belief that this personal 
failure owed much to the ETC’s scientific ‘blindness’ and conservatism needs 
qualification.  By 1922, and with the crucial backing of the ETC’s chairman John 
Denison-Pender and managing director Henry Grant, the firm had spent £10,000 on a 
new laboratory which had been a hive of activity: it was here that Davies made 
significant progress on a form of loaded cable that bypassed the need for high 
permeability iron and which was later tested on a small scale by TCMC and co-patented 
by the ETC; it was here that Higgitt, Wood and others continued developed the major 
components of the regenerator system; it was here that two new outside advisors, 
American electrical engineers Frederick Pernot and Lester Rich, refined their multi-
channel signalling apparatus whose patent license the ETC eventually purchased after the 
device was shown to double traffic-carrying capacity on an ETC cable; and it was here 
that work began on the use of thermionic valves in magnifiers and relays.104  The scale of 
the ETC’s post-war research into telegraphic apparatus may not have been comparable to 
that in Western Union, but it was certainly neither stagnant nor ineffective.  Some 
industry insiders certainly thought it could be doing more, but had no doubt that it exuded 
a more ‘progressive’ attitude than ever before.105 
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 Davies’s criticisms of the conservative attitude of cable manufacturers were more 
widely shared, and had greater justification.106  His frequent visits to the TCMC’s works 
would have revealed that this leading manufacturer was doing some research on high 
permeability iron alloys for use in loaded cables, but simply not on the scale of American 
firms such as Western Electric whose achievements both Davies and Lodge envied.107  A 
powerful measure of the American lead came in 1923 when the TCMC agreed to build 
and lay, for Western Union, a cable whose copper conductor was wrapped in a tape made 
from Western Electric’s high permeability nickel-iron alloy, ‘permalloy’, patented in 
1921.  Laid between New York and the Azores in 1924, it could handle four times more 
traffic as an ordinary cable.  It was partly the success of this first loaded long submarine 
cable that inspired the TCMC to build, for the Pacific Cable Board and Eastern Extension 
company, long cables using its own ‘mumetal’ alloy and which boasted a comparable 
increase in capacity.  For Davies, these moves would have seemed too little too late and 
illustrated that it took a ‘serious rival’ to ‘jolt’ cable manufacturers ‘out of the rut’.108 
 When these mumetal loaded cables were opened for business in 1926, the ETC 
entered one of the most difficult phases of its history.  Between 1892 and 1923, its 
ownership of the global cable network had dropped from 20.6% to 16.5% and with its 
associates its share had dropped from 63.1% to 42.7%.109   The Eastern group had lost 
most of its share to commercial operators such as the Western Union and to British 
imperial, French and Japanese government operators.  By late 1927, however, the Eastern 
group and many of its competitors were facing its most serious external threat to date: 
beam radio.   Between October 1926 and August 1927 the British Post Office-run 
Imperial Wireless Chain came into operation, a service exploiting the Marconi Wireless 
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Telegraph Company’s new system of wireless telegraphy involving concentrated short 
wave beams.110  It boasted a longer range and lower running costs than traditional long-
wave radio and enabled telegrams to be sent more quickly and cheaply than by cables.  
Senior ETC figures reiterated their old argument that communication by cable would 
long remain securer and less vulnerable to atmospheric electrical disturbances than 
wireless.111  However, a combination of beam competition and an increasingly unstable 
global economy reduced the ETC’s business for its telegrams and the firm could only 
continue paying healthy dividends and building up its reserve fund by cutting tariffs, 
selling cable ships, closing stations and making other severe reductions in working 
expenses.112 
 It is possible to suggest that had the ETC invested more heavily in research into 
loaded cables and exerted more pressure on cable manufacturers to produce the new 
designs they would have had a global network that would have been more effective at 
competing with beam radio.  In the mid-to late 1920s, however, a different technological 
response to competition had commercial and technical advantages to a firm laden with a 
vast, expensive and ageing chief asset and a small but effective culture of research and 
technical development.  While loaded cables promised to increase capacity between four 
and five times, they were approximately 15% more expensive to manufacture than ‘plain’ 
cables and could not realistically cope with duplex signalling.113  The regeneration 
system, however, was considerably cheaper and easier to install than any cable and could 
handle duplex.  By mid 1926 it had boosted capacity by approximately 30% on some of 
the ETC’s busiest lines, mainly by avoiding the errors and delays in manual working, and 
within two years had been installed all the principle routes.114 
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 The positive effect of the regeneration system, reduction of tariffs and economies 
in working on the ETC’s financial state was not enough, however, to dissuade senior 
figures in the ETC and its associates that, unless some kind of cooperative arrangement 
with the beam system could be negotiated, the businesses faced collapse.  By 1929 a 
solution had been brokered by the British government which wanted to protect a host of 
ailing cable companies – including the Eastern group and Pacific Cable Board – and their 
strategically critical networks – and wireless operators including the Post Office beam 
radio and the service division of Marconi Wireless.  Analysis of the eventual solution, a 
company called Imperial and International Communications (I&IC) that merged all these 
cable and wireless firms, is beyond the scope of this paper but the continued place of 
R&D in the reorganised business highlights an important aspect of the argument 
developed in this paper.115   Most of I&IC’s wireless research was done at Marconi’s 
large research laboratories in Chelmsford, but cable telegraphy research continued at the 
Electra House laboratory.  This latter space proved remarkably resilient in the early 1930s 
when the global economic slump had significantly reduced demand for cable and wireless 
communications and forced the I&IC to make drastic reductions in staff numbers and 
working expenses.  In early 1933 a proposal to close the laboratory was rejected partly 
because it was still recognised as a small investment that could continue to deliver 
substantial financial returns in terms of cheaper and more accurate cable telegraphy.116 
 
6: CONCLUSION 
 In his study of industrial research in British railway firms during the 1920s and 
1930s Divall concluded that this activity was modest and commercially effective, and 
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done on a much larger scale and more effectively organised than historians have 
assumed.  This does not, Divall warned, vanquish criticisms that British industry as a 
whole in this period significantly lagged the United States of America in terms of scale 
and organisational efficiency.117  This paper draws similar conclusions about a business 
operating a far larger communication network.  Its expenditure on research was tiny for a 
business of its size and the provision was small compared to that of its nearest 
competitor, the American-based Western Union, and yet its size and effectiveness were 
more significant than historians have assumed.  As a firm whose chief goals were 
providing a rapid and reliable service, maintaining and growing its capital-intensive cable 
network, and creating profits for healthy dividend payments and reserve funds, it proved 
cost effective for it to divide research and technical development unevenly between 
internal and external agencies.  After 1900, and with the drive towards greater automation 
and smaller operating costs, there were relatively sound commercial arguments for a 
small amount of research into instrumental development, standardisation of working 
practices and to a lesser extent, cable design, being done internally, and outsourcing some 
instrumental development and most of the work of cable design. 
 The case of the ETC suggests that caution is needed when characterising the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth cable industry as conservative.  There were unquestionably 
many areas (notably cable design) where cable firms were reluctant to make significant 
changes, but others, such as instrumental design, where the pace of development was a 
good deal faster, even if this did not produce radical changes.  The ETC is also important 
because it represents a type of business so often overlooked in studies of industrial R&D.  
Historians agree that service-sector businesses played a crucial role in British economic 
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growth, and the particular ways in which they organised R&D need to be part of a more 
nuanced understanding of British industrial R&D per se.118  One of the most striking, but 
comparatively underexplored, features of R&D in firms operating communication 
services is the extent to which it was distributed across different organisations, principally 
as a way of reducing costs and risks.  The success of late nineteenth and early twentieth 
century cable firms in Britain, America, Germany and other countries owed much to their 
capacity to form cartels, market-sharing agreements and other mutually profitable and 
usually transnational associations.119  The extent to which these interconnections may 
have operated at the level of R&D is only just beginning to be understood.  These 
interconnections have been seen as hampering research, but they may well have been 
more fruitful for this activity.  For example, the ETC conducted important research into 
wireless telegraphy on behalf of the Danish-based Great Northern Telegraph Company 
and, with the TCMC, shared research staff and resources, and proposed starting a private 
research company with the American-based cable operator, All-America Cables.120   How 
common and effective these collaborations were are questions that can be fruitfully 
investigated using the still relatively underexploited archives of the cable businesses, the 
private papers of cable men, as well as close readings of technical and financial 
periodicals.  In any case, this material will prove essential in extending the approach 
made here to the plethora of nineteenth and twentieth century cable firms across the globe 
and developing a comparative and altogether more nuanced understanding of their 














FIGURE 1: Horace Barwell, chief electrician at the Porthcurno cable station, in the 
‘experimental room’ at the station. Barwell was one of many ETC electricians who 
published original electrical researches undertaken in remote cable stations and cable-
laying ships.  From: ‘A Nerve Centre of Empire’, The Syren and Shipping, 4 January 






FIGURE 2: Plan view of two floors of Electra House in 1902.  The laboratory was 
initially located in the hexagonal room in the centre then, around 1905, relocated to 
rooms 95-96 originally occupied by the Traffic Department.  From: Anon., ‘Electra 
House: the New Home of the Eastern and Associated Telegraph Companies’, Builder’s 
Journal and Architectural Record, 20 August 1902, pp. 1-13, p. 8. (Image courtesy of 





FIGURE 3:  The Electra House laboratory in 1902.  Here the Electrician-in-Chief Henry 
Saunders is seen testing the performance of a siphon recorder whose paper tape trails 
onto the floor.  Behind him looms a large cabinet housing the ‘artificial line’: Anon., 
‘Electra House: the New Home of the Eastern and Associated Telegraph Companies’, 
Builder’s Journal and Architectural Record, 20 August 1902, pp. 1-13, p. 10 (Image 
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